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Abstract
In this study, we use the basic monopoly union approach of wage and employment
determination under stochastic revenue shocks to study unemployment insurance (UI) con-
tributions as policy instruments. Unemployment benefits are financed from UI contributions
that the government imposes on firms. The government has three policy alternatives: pas-
sive, fixed and active. In the case of the passive policy the contributions are adjusted
according to the state of the economy. In the case of the fixed policy the objective of the
government is to stabilize labour cost fluctuations and thereby employment, and in the case
of the active policy, to directly stabilize employment fluctuations. The eﬀects of the diﬀer-
ent policies are shown to depend on the size of the elasticity of substitution between the
factors of production in the economy. When the elasticity is small the UI contribution varies
counter-cyclically (procyclically) when the passive (active) policy is adopted. The fixed and
the active policies then stabilize the economy by smoothing out employment fluctuations.
When the elasticity is large the passive policy itself works as an automatic stabilizer leading
to a low UI contribution and high employment when economic state is bad.
JEL-codes: E61, J51, J58
2
1 Introduction
In most EU countries, unemployment benefits are at least partly financed by the
insurance contributions of employees and employers. In a pay-as-you-go financing
system the levels of the contributions are periodically adjusted to the state of the
economy. Intuition then says that the contributions tend to increase during a re-
cession. Counter-cyclical fluctuations of unemployment insurance (UI) contributions
increase the cost of labour in a recession and decrease it in an economic boom. In a
pay-as-you-go system, fluctuations in the contributions therefore tend to strengthen
business cycles.
When the financing system operates on the pay-as-you-go principle, the goal of
the government is simply to satisfy its period wise budget constraint. Could the gov-
ernment have other goals as well? Could the state aﬀect labour markets through its
UI contribution policy? Let us suppose that the state wants to decrease employment
fluctuations by smoothing out fluctuations in labour costs. This it could achieve
by aiming for fixed insurance contributions. Just such a policy alternative emerged
during the debate in Finland at the end of the 90s on the reform of unemployment
insurance financing. In connection with the reform, the central labour market orga-
nizations agreed to create so-called buﬀer funds. The idea of the buﬀer fund is to
set higher-than-needed insurance contributions when the economy is in a boom. The
additional UI contribution accrual, forming a buﬀer, is invested in the UI funds. Dur-
ing a recession the buﬀer can be used to cover the increased unemployment expenses,
and there is less need to increase contributions.2 Buﬀer funding, it was argued, would
decrease fluctuations in UI contributions and hence stabilize labour costs and thereby
employment.
Intuition again says that a fixed contribution smooths out fluctuations in employ-
ment to some extent, but could the state go even further with its insurance contribu-
tion policy. Let us suppose that the state aims for fixed employment. This goal could
2The Finnish system is described more closely in Holm, Kiander, Tossavainen (1999).
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be achieved by a system that adjusts the insurance contributions procyclically. Such
a system is discussed in Calmfors (2000a) and in Boeri, Brugiavini, Calmfors (2001).
Calmfors writes:
The Finnish system has been devised to smooth fluctuations in wage costs over business
cycles. A more ambitious system could instead aim at actually lowering wage costs in deep
recessions. This would amount to establishing an ex ante machinery for cuts in money wage
costs without having to cut money wages. (Calmfors 2000a)
Our goal is to study the eﬀects diﬀerent insurance contribution policies have
on wage levels and employment when labour markets are unionized and firms face
stochastic revenue shocks. Our model is based on the basic monopoly union model
examined in Oswald (1985), for example. The monopoly union model represents a
labour market relationship between one firm and one union and assumes that the
union sets the wage level and the firm decides employment, given the union’s wage
demand. Employed members of the union are then paid the union wage and unem-
ployed members get a fixed unemployment benefit.
In the basic model, financing of unemployment benefits is exogenous. We assume
that the unemployment benefits are financed by employers’ UI contributions. The
government decides the levels of the insurance contribution. We want to investigate
the eﬀects that the diﬀerent insurance contribution policies have under diﬀerent eco-
nomic conditions and therefore we add uncertainty to the basic model. In our model,
the firm’s revenue is stochastic when, with a certain probability, its revenue is either
good or bad. We also add a player to the game, whom we call the government or
policy-maker. The role of the government in our model is very simple. We assume
that it pays the unemployment benefits and finances them with UI contributions it
collects from the employed members of the union and from the firm.
The government has three policy alternatives. When the financing system operates
on the pay-as-you-go principle, we call the government’s insurance policy a passive
policy. When the government adjusts the contributions according to a fixed policy,
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its goal is to set the contribution at a level where it does not depend on the state
of the economy. The fixed contribution is set so that every period the government’s
expected budget balances. The third alternative we call an active policy, where the
goal of the government is to stabilize employment. When the government adopts the
active policy it sets a high contribution when economic conditions are good and a low
contribution when they are bad.
It turns out that the eﬀects the diﬀerent policies have on wages and employment
depend crucially on the size of the elasticity of substitution between the factors of
production in the economy. We get intuitive results when the elasticity is small.
When elasticity is small and the government adopts the passive policy, employment
and wages fluctuate procyclically and UI contributions counter-cyclically. When the
government commits itself to the fixed policy the UI contributions are fixed and
employment fluctuates, but less compared with the passive policy. Finally, when the
government adopts the active policy employment is fixed and the UI contributions
fluctuate procyclically, which also levels out wage fluctuations.
The situation is diﬀerent if the elasticity of substitution is large. The passive
policy then itself works as an automatic stabilizer. When the elasticity is large and
the government adopts the passive, policy it sets a high contribution when economic
conditions are good and a low contribution when they are bad. A low contribution
during a recession decreases the cost of labour and increases employment.
We also study how diﬀerent policies aﬀect the union’s expected utility. We cannot
get a closed form solution for the decision variables of the model, but our simulation
results indicate that when the elasticity is small the active policy leads to the highest
expected utility and when the elasticity is large the passive policy gives the highest
expected utility.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 we determine the equilibrium wage rate and employment. In Section 4
the diﬀerent policies are examined. The eﬀects of the diﬀerent policies on the union’s
utility are examined in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
Let us assume that the labour market consists of M unionized workers and one
representative firm. We can, for example, think that the model represents one sector
of the economy where the wage rate is determined by the union. The firm’s revenue
is subject to a shock and we denote the shock by θ. The shock can either be “good”,
when θ = θg, or “bad”, when θ = θb, and both θg, θg ∈ [θ, θ], θ < θ. We examine
neither the case where the firm going bankrupt due to a bad shock nor the case of a
good shock causing an excess demand for labour. Therefore the limits θ and θ are
determined such that if θ < θ the firm’s profit is below zero, and if θ > θ, there is
excess demand for labour in the labour market. The probability of a good shock is
P (θ = θg) = ψ and a bad shock P (θ = θb) = 1− ψ.
The firm produces the output with two factors of production — labour and capital
— and, for simplicity, we assume that capital is fixed, during the period we consider.
If the firm employs L workers it gets a revenue
θf(L,K), (1)
where we have normalized the price level to one. We assume that the production
function f(L,K) is twice diﬀerentiable and satisfies fL > 0, fK > 0, fKK < 0,
fLL < 0, and fLK > 0. The wage, w, is not the only labour cost because the firm also
has to pay an UI contribution which we denote by τ . The firm’s profit is then given
by
π = θf(L,K)− w(1 + τ)L− rK, (2)
where r denotes interest rate.
All M workers are members of the same union and we assume they are risk-
averse. A well-known result from labour taxation theory states that if the tax bases
of employers and employees are equal, the composition of wage and payroll tax does
not aﬀect the wage-bargaining outcome in the standard trade union models (Koskela
and Scho¨b, 1999). Therefore we assume, for simplicity, that the government does
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Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
not impose UI contribution on employees. Employed members then get wage w
and unemployed members receive a fixed unemployment benefit, b. The government
decides the level of the benefit. The union has the utilitarian utility function
V (w,L) = Lu(w) + (M − L)u(b), (3)
where u(·) denotes an increasing and concave utility function of a union member.
The government finances the unemployment benefits with the UI contributions it
imposes on the firm. The government sets the contribution τ such that the following
budget constraint is satisfied:
τwL = (M − L)b. (4)
The left side of the equation (4) denotes UI contributions paid by the firm, and the
right side unemployment expenses.
The course of events is as follows: First, the shock occurs. We assume that all
parties — the government, the union, and the firm — observe the shock. Second, the
government adjusts the UI contribution τ . Third, the union sets the wage level,
and last, the firm decides on employment. The fact that the shock occurs before
contribution, wage, and employment decisions are made is based on the assumption
that the business cycle is long enough for the government, the union, and the firm to
react to the shock. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the decisions.
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3 The determination of wage and employment
We assume that after the shock has occurred and the government has adjusted the
insurance contribution, the union presents its wage demand and the firm then decides
how many workers it employs. Given the wage decision of the union, the firm chooses
employment that maximizes its profit. We assume that the firm has a CES production
function
f(L,K) =
h
dL−ξ + (1− d)K−ξ
i− 1ξ , (5)
where −1 ≤ ξ ≤ ∞. The parameter d is related to the share of labour in production;
in the limit, as ξ → ∞, d equals the share of labour. We can now write the firm’s
profit function (2) in the form
π = θ
h
dL−ξ + (1− d)K−ξ
i− 1ξ − w(1 + τ )L− rK. (6)
From the firm’s maximization problem, maxL π, we can solve the “short-run”
labour demand function
L = L(w; θ) =


Ã
dθ
w
! ξ
1+ξ 1
1− d −
d
1− d


1
ξ
K, (7)
where w = w(1 + τ ) is the labour cost. In the case of a CES production function
the elasticity of substitution in the production is given by σ = 1
1+ξ . We set the fixed
capital, without loss of generality, equal to one and write the labour demand function
in the elasticity form when
L(w; θ) =


Ã
dθ
w
!1−σ
1
1− d −
d
1− d


σ
1−σ
. (8)
The union’s maximization problem now is
max
w
V (w,L) (9)
subject to
L = L(w; θ). (10)
8
The first-order condition of the maximization problem is
−η(w) [u(w)− u(b)] + u0(w)w = 0 (11)
where η(w) = −Lww
L
is the labour cost elasticity of the labour demand. We can then
write (11) in the form
η(w)
Ã
1− u(b)
u(w)
!
=
u0(w)w
u(w)
. (12)
If we assume that the union members have a CRRA utility function u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ we
can write the union’s pricing equation in the following form:
w =
Ã
1 +
ρ− 1
η(w)
! 1
ρ−1
b. (13)
From (13) we can see that the union’s optimal wage demand depends on the labour
cost elasticity of the labour demand η(w). The labour cost elasticity can be written
as
η = σ
1− s, (14)
where s = wLθf denotes the share of labour in output (see Appendix A). The elasticity
η increases when σ rises. In the special case when σ = 1 (Cobb-Douglas production
function) the labour cost elasticity of the labour demand is constant and we can solve
the union’s wage demand in a closed form. The wage level is then independent of
the economic state and of the level of the firm’s UI contribution τ . When σ 6= 1,
changes in the UI contribution and in the value of the shock aﬀect the union’s wage
demand through the labour cost elasticity η, and it turns out that the eﬀects depend
on whether the factors of production are complements (σ < 1) or substitutes (σ > 1).
We get the union’s optimal wage demand w∗ = w(τ ; θ) from the pricing equation
(13) and, by substituting w∗ for w in (8), optimal employment L∗ = L(τ , θ) from the
labour demand function (8). The impact of the UI contribution on the union’s wage
demand can be derived by total diﬀerentiation of equation (11) when
wτ = −
(u(w)− u(b)) −σ
(1−s)2 sτ
Vww
. (15)
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When Vww < 0 the sign of
dw
dτ depends on the sign of
ds
dτ . We can show that
sτ = sww =
s
1 + τ (1− σ) =



> 0 when σ < 1
= 0 when σ = 1
< 0 when σ > 1.
(16)
(see Appendix B). When we substitute (16) for sτ in (15) we get the following result:
Proposition 1 The total eﬀect of a change in UI contribution τ on wage level de-
pends on the elasticity of substitution as follows:
wτ



< 0 when σ < 1
= 0 when σ = 1
> 0 when σ > 1.
(17)
If the UI contribution increases and the elasticity of substitution is less than one,
the share of labour in output increases. A rise in the share of labour causes an increase
in the labour cost elasticity of labour demand which puts downwards pressure on the
union’s wage demand because higher elasticity makes it harder for the union to extract
rents. When the elasticity of substitution is less than one, the union decreases its wage
demand when the UI contribution increases. When the elasticity of substitution is
larger than one, the opposite happens. A rise in τ causes a fall in s which decreases
the labour cost elasticity of labour demand. A fall in η makes room for an increase
in wages.
We assume that η + ρ > 1 where ρ denotes the union members’ relative risk
aversion. We can then show that the UI contribution elasticity of the wage rate,
ωτ = wτ (1+τ)w , is always larger than minus one, that is ωτ > −1 (see Appendix C).
Therefore when the UI contribution increases, the wage rate either decreases, but less
than by the full amount of the tax rise (when σ < 1), or increases (when σ > 1).
A rise in the UI contribution then always increases the labour cost and decreases
employment, that is,
Lτ < 0 ∀ σ. (18)
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The impact of the shock on the union’s wage demand can be derived analogously.
From the first-order condition (11) it follows that
wθ = −
(u(w)− u(b)) −σ
(1−s)2sθ
Vww
(19)
and we can show that
sθ =
s
θ (σ − 1) =



< 0 when σ < 1
= 0 when σ = 1
> 0 when σ > 1.
(20)
From equations (19) and (20) we get the following result:
Proposition 2 The total eﬀect of a change in the value of the shock θ on wage level
depends on the elasticity of substitution as follows:
wθ



> 0 when σ < 1
= 0 when σ = 1
< 0 when σ > 1.
(21)
That is, if the elasticity of substitution is less than one, the union increases its
wage demand when the economy is in a boom and decreases it in a recession. When
the elasticity of substitution is higher than one the opposite happens. We can also
show that the shock elasticity of the wage rate, ωθ = wθθw , is never larger than one, that
is ωθ < 1 (see Appendix C). Hence a rise in the value of the shock always increases
employment, that is,
Lθ > 0 ∀ σ. (22)
4 Unemployment insurance contribution policies
Next we begin to analyze various UI contribution policies and their eﬀects on the
union’s wage and the firm’s employment decisions. The government in our model
finances unemployment benefits with employer’s UI contributions and also decides
both the level of the unemployment benefit, b, and the level of the UI contribution.
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Because our interest is in the eﬀects of diﬀerent contribution policies, we assume
that the level of the unemployment benefit is fixed. The government collects UI
contributions and invests them in the UI fund. We assume that the government
announces its contribution policy before wage and employment decisions are made
and that it cannot afterwards change the policy. We examine the consequences of
three diﬀerent policies: passive, fixed, and active policy. In the case of passive policy
the government adjusts the contribution according to the state of the economy. In
the case of fixed policy the government aims at labour cost stabilization and in the
case of active policy aims directly at employment stabilization.
4.1 Passive policy
In the case of the passive policy the government sets the level of the contribution
according to the state of the economy. The passive policy is actually used when the
financing system operates on the pay-as-you-go principle. The government sets the
contribution such that it can cover the unemployment expenses of every period with
the UI contributions it collects from the firm during that period. The government
then sets the contribution τ such that the budget constraint
τw(τ , θ)L(τ , θ) = (M − L(τ , θ))b (23)
is satisfied every period. The left side of equation (23) denotes the insurance contri-
butions collected from the firm, and the right side the total unemployment expenses.
We can write equation (23) in the form
τw(τ , θ) = Mb
L(τ , θ)
− b. (24)
Let us assume that the firm faces a negative shock that decreases its revenue.
A negative shock has a direct eﬀect on employment because a fall in revenue de-
creases labour demand and thereby employment. The shock has also an indirect
eﬀect through the union’s wage demand but its size depends on the elasticity of the
substitution. When the value of the shock falls, the union reacts by decreasing its
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wage demand if the elasticity of the substitution is smaller than one and by increasing
it if the elasticity is larger than one. In Figure 2, σ, and thereby also the labour cost
elasticity of labour demand, is small when the labour demand curve, drawn in (L,w)−
plane, is steep. A negative shock decreases labour demand and the labour demand
curve shifts downwards from Lg to L
0
b. When σ is small, the labour demand curve
also becomes steeper. If the shock had no eﬀect on the wage rate then employment
would decrease from L∗g to L
00
b . When σ < 1 the union, as a consequence of a negative
shock, decreases its wage demand. The indirect wage eﬀect therefore reduces the fall
in employment, as seen in Figure 2 from L00b to L
0
b. The opposite happens when σ > 1.
When the labour cost elasticity of labour demand is large the labour demand curve is
flat (Figure 3). A negative shock again decreases labour demand. The labour demand
curve becomes fatter and shifts downwards from Lg to L
0
b. The union reacts to the
shock by increasing its wage demand. The indirect wage eﬀect now increases the fall
in employment from L00b to L
0
b. We state this first observation as a proposition.
Proposition 3 When the firm’s revenue is fluctuating, employment and wages fluc-
tuate procyclically if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one, and employment
fluctuates procyclically and wages counter-cyclically if the elasticity of substitution is
larger than one. In the former case the wage eﬀect smooths out employment fluctua-
tions and in the latter case it strengthens them.
How does the government react to the shock when it adopts the passive policy?
Intuition suggests that the government increases τ when the economic state gets worse
but it turns out that the reaction depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution
σ. When σ increases, the labour cost elasticity of labour demand increases and
the higher the elasticity the larger is the eﬀect of a change in the labour cost on
13
Figure 2: Labour market equilibrium when σ <1
Figure 3: Labour market equilibrium when σ >1
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employment. When employment falls, as a consequence of a negative shock, the right
side of equation (24) increases. To balance its budget the government has to choose
such action that it either raises employment or increases the left side of (24). A rise
in τ always decreases labour demand and employment but its eﬀect on the union’s
wage demand depends on the size of σ. Let us first suppose that σ < 1. Employment
falls as a consequence of a negative shock but the shift is not large because the union
reacts to the shock by decreasing its wage demand. When σ, and thereby also the
labour cost elasticity of labour demand, is small the government can increase τ when
the state of the economy gets worse. A rise in τ always increases the labour cost and
decreases employment but the eﬀect is not large when σ, and thereby η, is small. The
union’s wage demand decreases but because the labour cost w(1 + τ) increases the
left side of equation (24) also increases when τ rises. Figure 2 shows labour demand
function shifting downwards from L0b to Lb and the new equilibrium at (L
∗
g, w
∗
g).
However, increasing τ is not the only possible government reaction when σ < 1.
When σ and increases, it raises the labour cost elasticity of labour demand and
thereby strenthens the eﬀect on employment of a change in the labour cost. The
impact of a negative shock on employment also increases because when σ approaches
one, disappears the indirect wage eﬀectthat increases employment. After some critical
value of the elasticity of substitution, σ ≥ bσ, a raise of τ has too large an eﬀect
on employment and the government chooses to decrease τ when the economic state
worsens. A fall in τ decreases the labour cost and thereby the left side of equation
(24) but significantly raises employment.
Let us next suppose that σ > 1 when the labour cost elasticity of labour demand
is large. A negative shock directly decreases labour demand and thereby employment
and a rise in the union’s wage demand strengthens the eﬀect. If the government then
increased τ , the union would react by raising its wage demand and that would have
a large, decreasing eﬀect on employment. But if the government decreases τ , labour
demand increases and the union decreases its wage demand; this has a increasing
eﬀect on employment. Therefore, when σ > 1 the government reacts to a negative
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shock by decreasing τ . Figure 3 shows labour demand function shifting upwards from
L0b to Lb and the new equilibrium at (L
∗
g, w
∗
g).
We can conclude that the government reacts to a negative shock by increasing
τ when σ < bσ and decreasing it when σ > bσ. The size of bσ depends on the other
parameters of the model. Therefore
τ θ



≤ 0 when σ < bσ
> 0 when σ > bσ. (25)
We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the government adopts the passive policy and the elasticity of sub-
stitution is small (σ < bσ) it sets a low insurance contribution when the economic
state is good and a high insurance contribution when the economic state is bad. Fluc-
tuations in the contribution level then strengthen employment and wage fluctuations
caused bythe stochasticity of the firm’s revenue. When the elasticity of substitution
is large (σ > bσ) the government chooses the opposite action and sets a high insur-
ance contribution when the economy is good and a low insurance contribution when
the economy is bad. Employment then fluctuates counter-cyclically. Wages fluctuate
counter-cyclically if bσ < 1 and bσ < σ < 1 and procyclically, if σ > 1.
Given that the elasticity of substitution is small, the passive policy strengthens
business cycles because it increases the cost of labour when the economic state is bad
and decreases it when it is good. If the elasticity of substitution is large the passive
policy starts to work like an automatic stabilizer. The UI contribution and the cost
of labour then decrease when the economic state worsens, which boosts employment.
The size of the elasticity of substitution is, of course, an empirical question. Em-
pirical evidence exists which quite strongly suggests that the elasticity of substitution
is diﬀerent from one, but there is no general agreement whether σ is larger or smaller
than one. Rowthorn (1999) presents a large set of cross-country estimates of σ and
bases his estimates on earlier published estimates of the real wage elasticity of labour
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demand. Among 52 estimates of σ Rowthorn reports, only ten exceed 0.5 and only
three of those exceed one. In a recent study by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) the
elasticity of substitution in Finland was estimated to be close to 0.5. Duﬀy and Pa-
pageorgiou (2000) provide evidence of σ being statistically significantly above one.
They use a panel of 82 countries over a 28-year period from 1960 to 1987 and report
estimates of σ of approximately 1.3 to 3.3. Therefore, in terms of empirical evidence,
the issue is open.
4.2 Fixed policy
In Finland the unemployment insurance financing system of was reformed at the end
of the 90s. Smoothing out fluctuations in insurance contributions was a goal set in
connection with the reform when the so-called buﬀer funds were established. The idea
of the buﬀer fund is to set high insurance contributions when the economic conditions
are good for the purpose of creating a surplus. When the economic conditions turn
bad, part of the unemployment expenses can be paid from the buﬀers and there is less
need to increase the insurance contributions. Buﬀer funding decreases fluctuations in
the insurance contributions.
Let us next suppose that the government wants to completely level out fluctuations
in UI contributions. We call this a fixed policy. The level of the contribution is chosen
such that the government’s expected budget is in balance. The fixed contribution, τ ,
then satisfies the equation
E[τw(τ , θ)L(τ , θ)− (M − L(τ , θ))b] = 0. (26)
which implies
ψ[τw(τ , θg)L(τ , θg)− (M − L(τ , θg))b]+
(1− ψ)[τw(τ , θb)L(τ , θb)− (M − L(τ , θb))b] = 0. (27)
We can write equation (27) in the form:
τ [ψwgLg + (1− ψ)wbLb] = b [M − (ψLg + (1− ψ)Lb)] , (28)
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where the left side is the expected income and the right side expected expenditure of
the UI fund.
Next we assume that the government follows the fixed policy, when, regardless of
the state of the economy, the UI contribution is fixed. We further assume that the
elasticity of substitution is small, that is, σ ≤ bσ. The fixed contribution, τ , is then set
such that τ g < τ < τ b where τ g and τ b are the good and bad state contributions when
the passive policy is adopted. Hence, in a good economic state the contribution is
“too high” and in a bad economic state “too low” compared to the contributions the
government sets when it follows the passive policy. During a boom the government
collects a surplus to the UI fund and uses it during a recession. The goal, when the
government uses fixed contributions, is to smooth out labour cost fluctuations.
The fixed policy also levels out the fluctuations in the union’s wage demand. The
inequality
τ g < τ < τ b (29)
implies that
w(τ g, θg) < w(τ , θg) < w(τ , θb) < w(τ b, θb). (30)
When the government uses the fixed policy the wage rate is lower in a good but higher
in a bad state of the economy than it is when the government uses the passive policy.
Employment fluctuates, but less than in the case of the passive contribution policy.
Because the UI contribution is fixed, the employment fluctuations are due to the wage
fluctuations and the shocks the economy faces. Inequalities (29), (30) and θg > θb
imply that
L(τ g, θg) > L(τ , θg) > L(τ , θb) > L(τ b, θb). (31)
The situation is diﬀerent when σ > bσ. When the government follows the passive
policy and σ > bσ the UI contribution fluctuates counter-cyclically, being high in a
good state and low in a bad state. The passive policy then stabilizes employment
fluctuations. The government sets the fixed contribution such that
τ g > τ > τ b. (32)
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The fixed contribution is then “too low” when the economic state is good and “too
high” when the state is bad. Adopting the fixed policy decreases employment fluctu-
ations but in an undesirable way because, compared with the passive policy, employ-
ment in a good state increases and in a bad state decreases. Because σ and thereby
η is large and the wage eﬀect when σ > 1 strengthens the impact of a change in the
contribution, the fixed policy can make employment fluctuate even procyclically. The
following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 5 If the government adopts the fixed policy by setting a fixed insur-
ance contribution in all economic states, with the elasticity of substitution being low
(σ ≤ bσ), wages and employment fluctuate less than with the passive policy. When the
elasticity of substitution is large the fixed policy either decreases employment fluctua-
tions or can even make employment fluctuate procyclically.
4.3 Active policy
The Finnish financing system and buﬀer funding has not been welcomed with en-
thusiasm in the economic literature. Lars Calmfors, for example, has criticized the
system as being under-ambitious. According to Calmfors (2000a), the goal of a more
ambitious system would be to actually decrease labour costs in a bad economy. Next
we examine the eﬀects of an ambitious system which aims not at fixed contributions
but at fixed employment. We call this an active policy.
Let us again assume that the firm faces a negative shock that decreases its revenue.
Labour demand and thereby employment falls. When the government is committed
to the active policy it adjusts the UI contributions such that employment is equal in
all economic states. We denote the fixed employment by L when
L =


Ã
dθg
wg
!1−σ
1
1− d −
d
1− d


σ
1−σ
=


Ã
dθb
wb
!1−σ
1
1− d −
d
1− d


σ
1−σ
. (33)
It is now easy to show that the active policy smooths away variations in the union
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wage demands. Equation (33) implies that
wg
θg
=
wb
θb
, (34)
that is, the government adjusts the contribution such that the “eﬀective” labour costs
do not depend on the state of the economy. When employment is fixed and equation
(34) holds, also the labour cost elasticity of labour demand is fixed (see equation
(14)). From the first-order condition of the union’s maximisation problem (11) we
can see that, when η(w) remains unchanged, the union wage demand is independent
of the state of the economy. The union wage demand remains unchanged, because the
government neutralizes the eﬀects the shocks have on employment before the union
makes its wage desicions.
When w is fixed and θg > θb equation (34) implies that τ g > τ b. To prevent a fall
in employment the government must, as a consequence of a negative shock, decrease
the UI contribution. Therefore, with all values of σ the UI contribution is higher
when the economic state is good than when it is bad.
When σ is low, the active policy is more eﬀective in smoothing out employment and
wage fluctuations, compared with the passive and fixed policy. When σ is high, the
government, adopting the passive policy, sets a high contribution in a good economic
state and a low contribution in a bad state, which implies that employment is lower
during a boom than during a recession. When the government adopts the active
policy, it, compared with the passive policy, decreases τ g and increases τ b, which
increases employment in a good stte and decreases it in a bad state.
The active policy levels out employment and wage fluctuations. When σ is low,
wages fluctuate procyclically when both the passive and the fixed policies are prac-
ticed. Compared with the passive and active policy, the government, adjusting the UI
contributions according to the active policy, increases τ g and decreases τ b. The wage
in a good state decreases and in a bad state increases. Hence, when σ is small, the
active policy reduces procyclical wage fluctuations. When σ is large, the active policy
increases the wage in a bad state and decreases it in a good state. We summarize the
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results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If the government adopts the active policy it sets a high insurance
contribution when the economy is good and a low insurance contribution when the
economy is bad with all values of the elasticity of substitution. Compared with the
passive policy, the active policy levels out employment and wage fluctuations with all
values of the elasticity of substitution.
4.4 A numerical example
We cannot solve the decision variables of the model, τ , w, and L, in a closed form and
therefore we have calculated a numerical example. In all of the following exercises we
assume that the union members have a CRRA utility function, that is, u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ .
The unemployment benefit b = 1, the number of the union membersM = 1, the union
members’ relative risk aversion ρ = 1.5, and the share of labour in the production
d = 0.7. We have calculated the same example with diﬀerent values of σ. To make
examples comparable, we have set the value of the good shock, θg, such that with each
σ employment in a good state is approximately 93 per cent. We have then adjusted
the value of the bad shock θb such that a fall in labour demand decreases employment
approximately five percentage points, from 93 per cent to 88 per cent, not taking
into account the eﬀect a negative shock has on wage w(τ ; θ). We assumed that all
parties — the government, the union, and the firm — observe the shock and know the
probability of a good shock, ψ. Here the probability of a good shock is ψ = 0.8.
Table 1 summarizes the results. When σ < 1 a negative shock decreases the
union’s wage demand which lessens the eﬀect the shock has on employment. In Table
1 we can see that when σ = 0.2, wages decrease from 2.583 to 2.480 which reduces
the fall in employment from the original five to only 1.24 percentage point. If the
government adopts the passive policy it increases the UI contribution from 2.91 to
3.98 per cent, which decreases employment to 91.08 per cent. The fixed and the active
policy then stabilize employment fluctuations. A negative shock has similar eﬀects
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when σ = 0.5 except that a change in τ has a much larger eﬀect on employment
because the labour cost elasticity of labour demand is larger.
Table 1 : The relationship between diﬀerent government UI policies
and UI contributions, employment, and wages.
Value of σ Policy τ g (%) τ b (%) Lg (%) Lb (%) wg wb
Before adjustment of τ 2.91 2.91 93.00 91.36 2.583 2.480
σ = 0.2 Passive 2.91 3.98 93.00 91.08 2.583 2.463
Fixed 3.11 3.11 92.96 91.31 2.580 2.477
Active 4.36 −1.90 92.64 92.64 2.559 2.559
Before adjustment of τ 4.55 4.55 93.00 89.80 1.651 1.633
σ = 0.5 Passive 4.55 18.88 93.00 76.95 1.651 1.558
Fixed 6.32 6.32 91.26 88.08 1.641 1.623
Active 6.96 3.71 90.64 90.64 1.638 1.638
Before adjustment of τ 5.54 5.54 93.00 88.31 1.359 1.357
σ = 0.9 Passive 5.54 1.03 93.00 97.44 1.359 1.360
Fixed 4.82 4.82 94.80 90.03 1.360 1.358
Active 5.20 3.29 93.86 93.86 1.359 1.359
Before adjustment of τ 5.93 5.93 93.00 87.45 1.268 1.270
σ = 1.2 Passive 5.93 3.88 93.00 95.32 1.268 1.267
Fixed 5.52 5.52 94.59 88.92 1.267 1.270
Active 5.81 4.32 93.46 93.46 1.268 1.268
When σ = 0.9, a negative shock still decreases wages which reduces the eﬀect
the shock has on employment. The labour cost elasticity is now so large that the
government, when it adjusts τ according to the passive policy, cannot increase τ but
balances its budget by decreasing the contribution which raises employment. The
critical value bσ is in our case somewhere between 0.5 and 0.9. When σ = 0.9 the UI
contribution, in the case of the passive policy, decreases from 5.54 to 1.03 per cent and
employment rises from 93 to more than 97 per cent. If the government now changed
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to the fixed policy it would have to decrease the good state and increase the bad
state contribution, which would increase employment in a good state and decrease
it in a bad state employment. Because σ, and thereby η, is large, changes in τ can
have substantial eﬀects on employment. The fixed policy could then, compared with
the passive policy, make employment fluctuate procyclically, as in our example. A
negative shock has similar eﬀects when σ > 1 except that the shock then increases
wages. When σ = 1.2, the wage eﬀect increases the fall in employment from the
original five to 5.25 percentage point.
5 The union’s utility
In the last section we examined the eﬀects of the diﬀerent policies on insurance con-
tribution, wage and employment levels. Next we start to analyze how the policies
aﬀect welfare. In choosing among the policies, one criterion the government could use
is the policies’ possible welfare eﬀects. In our model we have M workers, which are
represented by the union. It is therefore natural to use the union’s total utility as a
measure of welfare in our model economy.
Let us first examine how diﬀerent policies aﬀect the union’s expected utility. With
employment L(τ , θ) and wage w(τ ; θ) we can write the expected utility of the union
in the following form:
EV (τ , θ) = ψ [L(τ g, θg)u(w(τ g, θg) + (M − L(τ g, θg))u(b))] +
(1− ψ) [L(τ b, θb)u(w(τ b, θb)) + (M − L(τ b, θb)) u(b))] . (35)
We can write equation (35) in the form
EV (τ , θ) = ψLg (u(wg)− u(b)) + (1− ψ)Lb (u(wb)− u(b)) +Mu(b). (36)
The expected utility of the union depends on the variation of two factors: the em-
ployment and utility diﬀerence between an employed and an unemployed worker.
The union faces a trade-oﬀ between employment and the utility diﬀerence; for ex-
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ample increasing wages in a good state increases the utility diﬀerence but decreases
employment.
Table 2 : The relationship between diﬀerent
government UI policies and the union’s expected utility
Value of σ Policy Ug Ub EU
Passive 1.703 1.661 1.694
σ = 0.2 Fixed 1.702 1.666 1.694
Active 1.695 1.695 1.695
Passive 1.264 1.278 1.267
σ = 0.9 Fixed 1.270 1.255 1.267
Active 1.267 1.267 1.267
Passive 1.208 1.213 1.209
σ = 1.2 Fixed 1.211 1.200 1.209
Active 1.209 1.209 1.209
0.15
0.175
0.2
0.225
0.25
σ
0
0.05
0.1
∆θ
0
0.00005
0.0001
0.00015
1.15
1.175
1.2
1.225
1.25
σ
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
∆θ
-0.00001
-7.5 ×10-6
-5×10-6
-2.5 ×10-6
0
Figure 2: The diﬀerence between the union’s expected utility in the case of the active
and the passive policy.
Table 2 shows how the government’s diﬀerent policies aﬀect the union’s utility.
We have calculated the figures of the table using the same parameter values as in
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section 4.4 and in Table 1. On the basis of the table, we can make two observations.
First, with all values of σ the active policy levels out not only the fluctuations in
employment and in the union’s wage demand but also in the union’s utility. Second,
diﬀerences in the expected utilities are very small. However, the diﬀerences are too
large and too systematic to be rounding errors. In Figure 2 we can see the diﬀerence
between the union’s expected utility in the case of the active policy and the passive
policy when σ is small ( the left side figure) and when σ is large (the right side figure).
∆θ denotes the diﬀerence between a good and a bad shock. We can see that when
σ is small the diﬀerence is positive and increases when ∆θ increases. When σ is
small the union therefore prefers the active policy; it always gives the union higher
expected utility than the passive policy does. The situation diﬀers when σ is large.
The diﬀerence then is always negative and decreases when ∆θ increases. The active
policy always gives the union lower expected utility than the passive policy when σ
is large.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the eﬀects of diﬀerent unemployment insurance contribution policies
in a economy where labor markets are unionized, the firm’s revenue is fluctuating
and unemployment insurance is financed with employers’ UI contributions. The gov-
ernment, which imposes the contributions on the firms, has three policy alternatives.
We call the government’s policy ‘passive’ if it sets the contribution according to the
state of the economy. When the government aims at fixed contributions we have
a ‘fixed’ policy, and when it aims at fixed employment we call the policy ‘active’.
The argument for using of the fixed, and even the active, policy is as follows: When
the labour demand and thereby employment is fluctuating, the government, when
it uses the passive policy, must increase the employer’s UI contribution when the
economic state is bad. A rise in the contribution increases the cost of labour and
deepens the recession. The government could level out labour costs and employment
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fluctuations by setting a fixed contribution. Or the government could be even more
ambitious and implement an active employment policy by setting the contribution
level counter-cyclically. It turns out that the argument is valid only if the elasticity of
substitution between the factors of production, and thereby labour cost elasticity of
labour demand, is small in the economy. If the elasticity of substitution is large the
passive policy itself acts as an automatic stabilizer. The government then sets, when
the economic state is bad, a low UI contribution which decreases the cost of labour
and boosts bad employment.
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Appendices
A Determinants of labour demand elasticity
The output of the firm is given by the following CES production function:
f(L,K) =
µ
dL
σ−1
σ + (1− d)K
σ−1
σ
¶ σ
σ−1
. (37)
From the firm’s profit maximization we get
w = w(1 + τ) = θfL. (38)
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Diﬀerentiating the production function, we obtain
fL = d
Ã
f
L
! 1
σ
(39)
which implies that
w = θd
Ã
f
L
! 1
σ
. (40)
Diﬀerentiating (40) yields
dwL
dLw
=
1
σ
Ã
Ldf
fdL
− 1
!
(41)
=
1
σ

d
Ã
f
L
! 1
σ−1
− 1

 (42)
=
1
σ
Ã
wL
θf
− 1
!
. (43)
Rearranging (43) we get
η = σ
1− s (44)
where s = wLθf is the cost share of labour in output.
B The cost share of labour and UI contribution
The share of labour in output
s =
wL
θf . (45)
Then
sτ = sww =
Lw
θf +
wLww
θf −
wL
(θf)2θfLLww (46)
=
Lw
θf +
wLww
θf −
wL
(θf)2θd
Ã
f
L
! 1
σ
Lww (47)
=
Lw
θf
1
1 + τ +
Lw
θf
Lww
L
1
1 + τ −
Ã
wL
θf
!2
Lww
L
1
1 + τ (48)
=
s
1 + τ −
s
1 + τ η +
s2
1 + τ η (49)
=
s
1 + τ
(1− σ) . (50)
28
C Wage rate, UI contribution and revenue shock
In terms of τ we get from the first-order condition
wτ = −
Vwτ
Vww
(51)
where
Vwτ = [u(w)− u(b)]
Ã
−σ
(1− s)2
!
sww (52)
and
Vww = [u(w)− u(b)]
Ã
−σ
(1− s)2
!
sw(1 + τ) + u0(w)(1− η) + wu00(w). (53)
When we substitute (51) for wτ in equation ωτ = wτ (1+τ)w we get
ωτ =
− [u(w)− u(b)]
³
−σ
(1−s)2
´
sw(1 + τ )
[u(w)− u(b)]
³
−σ
(1−s)2
´
sw(1 + τ) + u0(w)(1− η) + wu00(w)
. (54)
When σ > 1 wτ > 0 and ωτ is positive. We therefore only have to consider the case
where σ < 1 when sw > 0. From (54) we see that if
u0(w)(1− η) + wu00(w) < 0 (55)
the elasticity ωτ > −1. Condition (55) holds when η + ρ > 1 where ρ denotes union
members’ relative risk aversion.
In terms of θ we get from the first-order condition
wθ = −
Vwθ
Vww
(56)
where
Vwθ = [u(w)− u(b)]
Ã
−σ
(1− s)2
!
sθ (57)
Vww = [u(w)− u(b)]
Ã
−σ
(1− s)2
!
sw(1 + τ) + u0(w)(1− η) + wu00(w) (58)
We can write sθ =
−sww
θ . When we substitute (56) for wθ in equation ωθ =
wθθ
w
we
get
ωθ =
[u(w)− u(b)]
³
−σ
(1−s)2
´
sw(1 + τ )
[u(w)− u(b)]
³
−σ
(1−s)2
´
sw(1 + τ ) + u0(w)(1− η) + wu00(w)
(59)
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When σ > 1 wθ < 0 and ωθ is negative. We therefore only have to consider the case
where σ < 1 when sw > 0. From (59) we see that if
u0(w)(1− η) + wu00(w) < 0 (60)
the elasticity ωθ < 1. Condition (60) holds when η + ρ > 1 where ρ denotes union
members’ relative risk aversion.
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